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CRIMINAL LAw-AFFRMATIVE DEFENSES IN THE WASHINGTON CRIM-
INAL CODE-THE IMPACT OF Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684
(1975)
A Maine jury found Stillman E. Wilbur, Jr.$ guilty of murder after
the prosecution's proof of two elements: (1) that the homicide was
unlawful, and (2) that it was intentional. Wilbur offered no evidence
on his behalf to negate or otherwise refute the state's case other than
his statement that he attacked the deceased in a frenzy provoked by a
homosexual advance. The trial judge instructed the jury that if the
prosecution established the above two elements, malice aforethought
was to be conclusively inferred, unless the defendant proved by a fair
preponderance of the evidence that he had acted in the heat of passion
on sudden provocation. This instruction was consistent with the
Maine homicide statutes1 which made murder and manslaughter dif-
ferent degrees of the same offense, with the onus on the defendant to
present evidence sufficient to reduce the penalty. Unsuccessful in over-
turning the judgment of conviction in the Supreme Judicial Court of
Maine,2 Wilbur filed a writ of habeas corpus in the United States dis-
trict court.3 That court granted the writ, and its decision was affirmed
by the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.4 Shortly thereafter the
Maine supreme judicial court decided another case contrary to the
federal holdings,5 reaffirming its view that murder and manslaughter
were merely two different degrees of a single offense. The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari and remanded Wilbur's case
to the court of appeals for reconsideration in accordance with the
Maine supreme judicial court's construction of the state homicide stat-
utes.6 After the court of appeals found a denial of due process, 7 the
1. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2651 (1964) (repealed 1975) provided: "Who-
ever unlawfully kills a human being with malice aforethought, either express or
implied, is guilty of murder and shall be punished by imprisonment for life." The
Maine manslaughter statute, id. § 2551 (repealed 1975), provided in relevant part:
"Whoever unlawfully kills a human being in the heat of passion, on sudden provoca-
tion, without express or implied malice aforethought ... shall be punished by a fine of
not more than $1,000 or by imprisonment for not more than 20 years ... .
2. State v. Wilbur, 278 A.2d 139 (Me. 1971).
3. Wilbur v. Robbins, 349 F. Supp. 149 (S.D. Me. 1972).
4. Wilbur v. Mullaney, 473 F.2d 943 (Ist Cir. 1973).
5. State v. Lafferty, 309 A.2d 647 (Me. 1973).
6. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 414 U.S. 1139 (1974).
7. Wilbur v. Mullaney, 496 F.2d 1303 (Ist Cir. 1974).
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Supreme Court again granted certiorari8 and unanimously affirmed
the decision. Held: Once the heat of passion defense has been prop-
erly raised in a homicide case, the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment requires the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the
absence of such defense. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
The Court reached this decision on the basis of three factors: (1)
the consequences resulting from a verdict of murder differ signifi-
cantly from those resulting from a verdict of manslaughter; (2) any
other decision would have allowed a state to undermine protected in-
terests without effecting any change in the substantive law; and (3)
historically, malice aforethought 9 has been the single most important
factor in determining culpability for murder. Thus, when there is a
significant distinction between crimes (e.g., between murder and man-
slaughter), these considerations compel the state to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt the fact upon which the distinction turns.
The Washington legislature recently enacted a revised criminal
code, effective July 1, 1976,10 which contains several presumptions
8. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 419 U.S. 823 (1974).
9. "Malice aforethought" has been defined many ways, most statutory definitions
focusing on a vicious or callous disregard of the likelihood of harm resulting from an
action. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Malone, 354 Pa. 180, 47 A.2d 445. 449 (1946)
("the intentional doing of an uncalled-for act in callous disregard of its likely harm-
ful effects on others"); Commonwealth v. McLaughlin. 293 Pa. 218, 142 A. 213. 215
(1928) ("wicked disregard of the consequences of his acts"). Several jurisdictions
define the phrase simply as a wrongful act accomplished without any mitigating factors.
See, e.g., Nunez v. State, 383 P.2d 726, 729 (Wyo. 1963) ("intentional killing of a
human being by another, without legal justification or excuse"). See generally R.
PERKINS, PERKINS ON CRIMINAL LAW 766-71 (2d ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as
PERKINS]; W. CLARK & W. MARSHALL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CRIMES § 10.05, at
-634-39 (7th ed. M. Barnes 1967).
In the new Washington criminal code, R.C.W. title 9A. "malice" is defined as
follows:
[A] n evil intent, wish, or design to vex, annoy, or injure another person. Malice
may be inferred from an act done in wilful disregard of the rights of another, or
an act wrongfully done without just cause or excuse, or an act or omission of
duty betraying a wilful disregard of social duty ....
WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.04.110(12) (Supp. 1975).
10. WASH. REV. CODE tit. 9A (Supp. 1975). In response to concerns over an
anachronistic state criminal code (WASH. REV. CODE tit. 9. which was passed in 1909),
the Judiciary Committee of the Washington Legislative Council researched and pre-
pared a revised Washington criminal code, complete with commentary, in December
1970. Judiciary Committee, Washington Legislative Council, Revised Washington
Criminal Code, Dec. 3, 1970 [hereinafter cited as Judiciary Committee Proposed
Code]. A history of the compilation of this code is described in Holmquist. The
Draftsman's View of the Revised Code, 48 WASH. L. REV. 277 (1972). In developing
the new statutes, this committee drew on the Model Penal Code, recently revised
codes from other jurisdictions, and existing Washington statutory and case law. See
Holmquist, supra at 278. The Washington legislature did not pass the new code in
1971 or 1972, and in 1973 the Washington State Association of Prosecuting Attorneys
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and preponderance of the evidence (affirmative) defenses. This note
will discuss the procedural effect of proof burdens and presumptions
and will apply the reasoning of the Court in Mullaney v. Wilbur to
Washington's new criminal code, contending that all but two defenses
deny due process to the defendant under the Mullaney standard and
should be changed by the Washington legislature to conform to con-
stitutional requirements."'
I. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BURDENS,
PRESUMPTIONS, AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
A. The Procedural Effects of the Burdens of Production and
Persuasion and of Presumptions
Whether a criminal defendant chooses to submit a defense or to
remain silent, the state must always prove beyond a reasonable doubt
every fact necessary to constitute the crime.12 A defendant's silence
never proves guilt. Nonetheless, it is likely to affect a jury adversely,
and a defendant is virtually compelled to offer some defense to the
charges when confronted with a strong case for the state.13 The prof-
drafted a prosecutors' version of the code. Washington State Association of Prosecuting
Attorneys, Washington Criminal Code (1973 Draft). The finished bill passed by the
legislature is a combination of both codes. Ch. 260, [1975] Wash. Laws 1st Ex. Sess.
817, as amended, ch. 9, [1975-76] Wash. Laws 2d Ex. Sess. 17.
11. Several other states will be similarly affected by the Mullaney holding, having
provided for analogous burdens by statute or judicial decision. Included are the fol-
lowing: Connecticut (CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 53a-54a (West Supp. Pamphlet
1975)); Maryland (Wilson v. State, 261 Md. 551, 276 A.2d 214 (1971); Elliott v.
State, 215 Md. 152, 137 A.2d 130 (1957)); New York (N.Y. PENAL LAW § 25.00
(McKinney 1975)); North Carolina (State v. Winford, 279 N.C. 58, 181 S.E.2d 423
(1971)); and West Virginia (State v. Stevenson, 147 W. Va. 211, 127 S.E.2d 638
(1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 938 (1963)). State courts have already begun to con-
front the problem. See note 48 infra.
12. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
13. When presumptive language operates in a statute, it may be practically neces-
sary for the defendant to take the stand. Commentators Ashford and Risinger illustrate
why:
[A] jury, having found A and B, and having been informed that a finding of C
is correct in the eyes of the law, will quite naturally look to see if there is any
reason not to find C. If there is no evidence which tends to show not-C, they will
all but inevitably find C. Thus, while it is true that under the instructions the jury
must decide that C has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt or else find not-C,
the instructions have left no doubt in their minds that C is a correct result.
Presumptions, Assumptions, and Due Process in Criminal Cases: A Theoretical Over-
view, 79 YALE LJ. 165, 199 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Ashford]. Many defendants
would choose not to take the stand for a variety of reasons. If the only way for the
defendant to prove not-C is to take the stand where he or she would otherwise have
chosen not to testify, Ashford and Risinger suggest that the cross-examination be
severely limited. Ashford, supra at 176. See also note 67 infra.
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fered defense must meet one of two burdens of proof: the burden of
production, or the burden of persuasion. 14
The burden of production is most simply defined as "producing
evidence satisfactory to a judge of a particular fact in issue."' 15 Under
this requirement the defendant must offer evidence of any defense to
be considered in the proceeding. Whether he or she has satisfactorily
met the burden of production is a question of law for the court.' 6 If
this burden has been met, the state must negate the defense with proof
14. The division of the burden of proof into two procedural categories was first
articulated in Thayer, The Burden of Proof, 4 HARV. L. REV. 45 (1890). and
shortly thereafter in J. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COM-
MON LAW 353-89 (1898).
15. MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 336 (2d ed. E. Cleary
1972) [hereinafter cited as MCCORMICK]. In a criminal case, the state has met its
burden of production if "any reasonable inference may be drawn from the state's
evidence which will support a guilty verdict," State v. Emerson, 5 Wn. App. 630, 634.
489 P.2d 1138, 1141 (1971), or if "the state produced substantial evidence tending to
establish circumstances from which the jury could logically and reasonably conclude
that appellant [was guilty of the crime]." State v. Pristell, 3 Wn. App. 962. 964.
478 P.2d 743, 744 (1970).
When the burden of production is on the defendant, he or she must "make out his
defense . . . but it is not incumbent upon him to prove [such defense] beyond a
reasonable doubt." State v. Jones, 2 Wn. App. 627, 635 n.3. 472 P.2d 402. 407 n.3
(1970).
Unlike the standard for meeting a burden of persuasion, which varies greatly de-
pending on whether the case is civil (where the burden generally can be met with a
preponderance of the evidence) or criminal (where the burden is always on the state
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt), the standard for meeting the burden of produc-
tion is the same in both instances. See generally R. MEISENHOLDER, 5 WASHINGTON
PRACTICE § 551 (1965) [hereinafter cited as MEISENHOLDER]. Washington civil cases
offer more specific definitions of evidence adequate to meet this burden. The burden of
production has not been met if "there is no evidence at all .... " Kaiser v. Suburban
Transp. Sys., 65 Wn. 2d 461, 463, 398 P.2d 14, 15 (1965); no substantial evidence.
Trudeau v. Haubrick, 65 Wn. 2d 286, 396 P.2d 805 (1964); or "no evidence or rea-
sonable inference therefrom," Bailey v. Carver, 51 Wn. 2d 416, 418, 319 P.2d 821,
822 (1957). A "scintilla of evidence" is not enough. Knight v. Trogdon Truck Co..
191 Wash. 646, 653, 71 P.2d 1003, 1006 (1937).
The newly adopted Washington criminal code does not articulate a specific quantum
of evidence necessary to meet this burden of production; however, the judiciary com-
mittee suggested "some evidence." Judiciary Committee Proposed Code, supra note 10,
§ 9A.04.120, Comment. In practice, this is probably how the burden of production
will be interpreted. See Cosway, The Revised Washington Criminal Code's Vital
Structure: The Burden of Proof, Felony Murder, and Justification Burdens, 48 WASH.
L. REV. 57, 67 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Cosway]. This is the same standard that
is employed by the federal system. Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469 (1895).
"Slight evidence" has been held to meet this burden, Howard v. United States, 232
F.2d 274, 276 (5th Cir. 1956); but the "merest shadow" has been found to be not
enough, Battle v. United States, 209 U.S. 36, 38 (1908).
16. On a challenge to sufficiency of evidence in a criminal case, it has often been
stated that the evidence must be "interpreted most strongly against the moving party
and in the light most favorable to the opposing party, and whether the evidence is suf-
ficient to submit the issue to the jury is a question of law for the court and no element
of discretion is involved." State v. Zurich, 72 Wn. 2d 31, 34, 431 P.2d 584. 587 (1967).
See generally MEISENHOLDER, supra note 15, § 551.
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beyond a reasonable doubt; and absent such proof, the defendant
cannot be found guilty.17 In the new Washington criminal code, use of
the term "defense" indicates that the defendant has the burden of pro-
duction.
In some situations, a defendant must also carry the burden of per-
suasion, i.e., he or she is required to establish an affirmative defense, 18
typically with proof by a preponderance of the evidence. 19 If the de-
17. At least with respect to the insanity defense, in jurisdictions placing the burden
of production on the defendant and the burden of persuasion on the state, courts have
differed as to whether the state must provide evidence after the defendant has met
the burden of production in order to meet the burden of persuasion. Some courts
have held that it is mandatory for the state to produce some evidence in order to
prove the element beyond a reasonable doubt. This generally means that the state
must offer some rebuttal evidence of its own and cannot rely on cross-examination of
defendant's witnesses. See Hartford v. United States, 362 F.2d 63 (9th Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 883 (1966); Phillips v. United States, 311 F.2d 204 (10th Cir.
1962). Other courts, however, have upheld convictions where the government pre-
sented no rebuttal evidence on the grounds that it is within the province of the jury
to determine doubt as to the defendant's sanity and that the jury is not compelled to
accept uncontradicted opinion testimony of insanity. See State v. Schantz, 98 Ariz.
200, 403 P.2d 521, cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1015 (1966); State v. Joseph, 96 Conn. 637,
115 A. 85 (1921); Henton v. State, 131 Neb. 622, 269 N.W. 116 (1936).
18. The term "affirmative defense" may cause some confusion. The Judiciary Com-
mittee Proposed Code describes an affirmative defense as calling only for the burden
of production, while the burden of persuasion remains on the state. Judiciary Com-
mittee Proposed Code, supra note 10, § 9A.04.120. The newly adopted criminal code
does not use the term "affirmative defense," apparently because of concern over this
potential confusion. Letter from Murray B. Guterson, Chairman of the Task Force
on the Criminal Code, to Board of Governors, Washington State Bar Association,
Sept. 1974, in Washington State Criminal Justice Training Commission, Revised
Criminal Code Training and Seminar Manual introduction-3 (G. Golob & G. Mooney
eds. 1976).
In its traditional sense, "affirmative defense" has had the effect of placing upon the
defendant both burdens. This has been true both in Washington and in other jurisdic-
tions. See State v. Moses, 79 Wn. 2d 104, 483 P.2d 832 (1971); State v. Putzell, 40
Wn. 2d 174, 242 P.2d 180 (1952); State v. Clark, 34 Wash. 485, 76 P. 98 (1904);
W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 21, at 152-53 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as LAFAVE]. For purposes of this note, "affirmative defense" will be
used in its broadest sense as giving the defendant the total burden of proof, both as
to production and persuasion.
19. Most definitions of "a preponderance of the evidence" have proved more con-
fusing than helpful, and it has been suggested that the term be used without any
attempt at explanation. See MEISENHOLDER, supra note 15, § 552, at 515.
The jury is generally instructed that "preponderance" does not necessarily relate
to quantity of evidence, but should be weighed as to what evidence is most convincing.
For various definitions of "preponderance of the evidence" in Washington civil cases,
see id. § 552. At the time of this writing, proof by a preponderance of the evidence in
criminal cases has been discussed in Washington only in the context of the insanity
defense. See State v. Putzell, 40 Wn. 2d 174, 242 P.2d 180 (1952); State v. Clark,
34 Wash. 485, 76 P. 98 (1904). One form of jury instruction used in the Washington
superior courts states as follows:
In instructing you that the defendant has the burden of proving his insanity or
mental irresponsibility by a preponderance of the evidence, the court does not
necessarily mean that the defendant must prove his insanity or mental irresponsi-
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fendant is not successful in meeting the double burden of production
and persuasion, he or she will be found guilty if the state has proven
the statutory elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. When
allowed, an affirmative defense is considered to function indepen-
dently of the elements of the crime; it is seen as an additional factor of
justification upon which a defendant may escape conviction. 20 In the
Washington criminal code, affirmative defenses are codified as "de-
fenses by a preponderance of the evidence. 21
Some presumptions22 also operate as affirmative defenses by trans-
ferring both the burden of production and the burden of persuasion to
the defendant.23 A rebuttable presumption in criminal law normally
allows a fact to be inferred from the evidence presented and assists the
state in proving the statutory elements of a crime. 24 In Mullaney,
however, the state relied on a presumption of implied malice, which
bility by the greater number of witnesses, but by the greater weight of credible
evidence in the case. By preponderance of the evidence, the court does not mean
the greater number of witnesses on a material point, but rather the weight of the
evidence, that evidence which, when fairly and impartially considered by the jury.
produces the stronger impression and has the greatest weight with you, and is
more convincing as to its truth when weighed against the evidence in opposition
thereto.
Criminal Jury Instructions 117 (K. Callow & W. Stuart eds. 1971).
20. See text accompanying notes 27-32 infra.
21. See notes 53-59 infra.
22. Although "presumptions" are defined in a variety of fashions (one commen-
tator has listed at least eight meanings of the term employed by courts, see Laughlin.
In Support of the Thayer Theory of Presumptions, 52 MIcti. L. REv. 195. 196-207
(1953)). McCormick points out that a presumption is at least a "standardized prac-
tice, under which certain facts are held to call for uniform treatment with respect to
their effect as proof of other facts." MCCORMICK. supra note 15. § 342, at 803.
23. Professors LaFave and Scott distinguish a presumption that shifts the burden
of persuasion to the defendant from an affirmative defense, in that the former concerns
matters relating to a basic element of the crime, whereas in an affirmative defense,
the proof is related to a collateral matter. LAFAVE, sttpra note 18, § 21, at 148. The
defendant in either case, however, will be found guilty if he or she cannot prove the
issue in question by a preponderance of the evidence. Analyzing the substantive effect
of both statutory provisions. Ashford and Risinger conclude: "Presumptive language
which operates to shift the burden of persuasion is not distinguishable on any signifi-
cant ground from the creation of an affirmative defense." Ashford, supra note 13. at
201. The American Civil Liberties Union distinguishes clearly between presumptions
and affirmative defenses, the latter being the only cases where the burden of persuasion
is shifted to the defendant. Testimony of the American Civil Liberties Union Before
the Senate Subcommittee on Criminal Law and Procedures 1-4, March 21. 1972
(ACLU report on the Final Report of the National Commission on Reform of
Federal Criminal Laws).
24. Criminal presumptions are subject to stricter constitutional scrutiny than are
civil presumptions. Justice Black, in his dissent in United States v. Gainey. 380 U.S.
63. 74 (1965), notes that this "follows from the fact that the burden of proof in a
civil lawsuit is ordinarily merely a preponderance of the evidence, while in a criminal
case where a man's life, liberty, or property is at stake, the prosecution must prove
his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 79. As such, the majority in Gainey was
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required the defendant to prove that he had acted in the heat of pas-
sion on sudden provocation. Similarly, in Washington the state can
rely on a presumption that a defendant who was unlawfully present in
a building intended to commit burglary, thereby requiring the de-
fendant to prove noncriminal activity. 25 These "presumptions" do not
simply assist the state in its factual proof, but actually shift the burden
of persuasion to the defendant.
B. Varying Views on Affirmative Defenses
Determining which fact constitutes an "element" of a crime is
closely intertwined with allocating proof burdens.26 Clearly those fac-
tors specifically set out in criminal statutes are elements that must be
proven by the state. Certain statutory elements, however, can be
proven through circumstantial evidence with the assistance of a pre-
sumption.
Although the term "element" encompasses both kinds of facts, ne-
cessitating state's proof beyond a reasonable doubt, it is not clear that
the negation of an asserted defense likewise becomes an "element" for
proof purposes. Some defenses directly negate a statutory element
(e.g., alibi) and, as such, the state must always prove the nonexistence
of the defense for an effective conviction: Other defenses operate to
mitigate or excuse the behavior (e.g., self-defense, entrapment) or,
more generally, concern the defendant's inability to take responsibility
for the criminal action (e.g., insanity). Although these defenses do not
technically negate statutory elements, they imply a lack of culpability
careful to point out that a criminal presumption is only a permissible inference. Id. at
70. The Washington court also follows this principle:
[A statutory] presumption is not binding upon the jury [in a criminal case]
even though the fact to be presumed is unrefuted by the defendant .... [T) he
state must still sustain the burden of proving the defendant's guilt beyond a rea-
sonable doubt. In other words, it should be made clear that the statutory pre-
sumption permits, but in no way directs, the jury to convict the accused, and
must be considered by the jury in the light of the presumption of innocence which
arises upon a plea of not guilty and accompanies the accused throughout the trial
until overcome by evidence which convinces the jury of the accused's guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt.
State v. Person, 56 Wn. 2d 283, 288, 352 P.2d 189, 192-93 (1960). The above in-
struction may still be subject to constitutional question. See note 67 infra.
25. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.52.040 (Supp. 1975).
26. Although the Washington legislature adopted the Judiciary Committee Pro-
posed Code language stating that each element must be proven beyond a reasonable
doubt, it neglected to include a definition of "element of an offense." See id. §
9A.04.100; Judiciary Committee Proposed Code, supra note 10, § 9A.04.120(1).
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for the action such that society will not impose criminal sanctions. But
whereas it is agreed that a successful defense will relieve the defendant
from liability, it is not clear who must bear the burden of persuasion.
Affirmative defenses lighten the state's burden by shifting a significant
amount of responsibility to the defendant, and one's view of the state's
role in obtaining criminal convictions conditions one's acceptance of
affirmative defenses as procedural devices.
At least one commentator has found affirmative defenses to be un-
constitutional per se, arguing that whereas successfully establishing
one's affirmative defense defeats or reduces culpability, the negative of
such affirmative defense is necessarily a "fact" necessary to constitute
the crime. 27 Under this approach, it is a semantic argument to say that
the affirmative defense involves a "collateral matter" not relating to an
element of the crime. If the defendant escapes culpability for his ac-
tion, some implied element of criminal culpability must have been
negated. Thus, the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt must
always be on the state once a defense has been raised.
Other commentators do not consider negation of affirmative de-
fenses a necessary element in determining guilt.2 8 The defendant is
regarded as guilty of the crime upon the state's proof beyond a reason-
able doubt of the stated elements. Under this viewpoint the affirmative
defense, provided as a matter of legislative "grace," presents only an
additional factor upon which the defendant may escape culpability. 29
The balancing test actually employed by the Court in Mullaney was
foreshadowed by the work of Ashford and Risinger.30 These writers
subject affirmative defenses to stricter constitutional scrutiny than pre-
sumptions. 31 Such scrutiny requires that several factors be satisfied
27. See Fletcher, Two Kinds of Legal Rules: A Comparative Study of Burden-of-
Persuasion Practices in Criminal Cases, 77 YALE L.J. 880 (1968) [hereinafter cited
as Fletcher].
28. See Christie & Pye, Presumptions and Assumptions in the Criminal Law:
Another View, 1970 DUKE L.J. 919 [hereinafter cited as Christie]. These writers ex-
tensively discuss affirmative defenses, but define them as defenses requiring only a
burden of production, and not of persuasion as in the Washington statutes. The dif-
ference is very significant in terms of the defendant's ability to successfully establish a
defense. Although no articles have been written justifying the shifting of both the
burdens of persuasion and production, the arguments asserted by Christie and Pye
would apply.
29. See note II1 and accompanying text infra, presenting the explanation given
by the New York legislature concerning the burden of persuasion on the defendant
in the case of felony murder.
30. Ashford, supra note 13.
31. Ashford, supra note 13, at 193. Presumptions, as defined by Ashford and
Risinger. give the defendant only the burden of production and not the ultimate bur-
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before requiring the defendant's proof of an affirmative defense: a
higher probability of correlation between guilt and the absence of the
affirmative defense than for a presumption (burden of production); a
stronger state interest in terms of the difficulty in producing evidence;
and a high probability that the defendant can successfully establish
the affirmative defense.32
II. THE MULLANEY STANDARD FOR AFFIRMATIVE
DEFENSES
The conclusions of the Court in Mullaney are grounded fundamen-
tally in its prior decision in In re Winship.33 In Winship, a 12-year-old
boy was judged to be delinquent by reason of theft. The judge, em-
ploying a provision of the New York Family Court Act,34 based his
finding of delinquency on a preponderance of the evidence. In a 4-3
decision, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the due process
clause protects any accused, juvenile or adult, against conviction ex-
cept upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to
constitute the crime.3 5 Although a number of Supreme Court cases
had implicitly recognized the constitutional imperative of the reason-
able doubt standard3 6 in criminal proceedings and every state had
employed such a standard for adult convictions,37 Winship was the
first decision to expressly state that the reasonable doubt standard is a
procedural safeguard of constitutional stature.
The Court found this standard to be a mandatory safeguard for the
den of persuasion. As affirmative defenses represent a greater threat to the defendant,
these commentators find that the due process standard must be substantially higher.
The Court in Mullaney agreed with this basic concept: "[T] he Due Process Clause
demands more exacting standards [than for a presumption] before the State may
require a defendant to bear this ultimate burden of persuasion." 421 U.S. at 703 n.3 1.
32. Ashford, supra note 13, at 186-93.
33. 397 U.S. 358 (1970). See generally Comment, Proof Beyond a Reasonable
Doubt in Juvenile Proceedings, 84 HARV. L. REV. 156 (1970); Comment, Juveniles
Must Be Proven Guilty Beyond a Reasonable Doubt When Accused of Criminal Viola-
tions, 46 NOTRE DAME LAW. 373 (1971).
34. N.Y. FAMILY CouRT ACT § 744(b) (McKinney 1975).
35. 397 U.S. at 364. It is interesting that the word "fact" was used instead of the
traditional word "element." Perhaps the Court did this to stress substantive considera-
tions over traditional procedural requirements."The Court again used the word "fact"
in the Mullaney decision. 421 U.S. at 690.
36. See, e.g., Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-26 (1958) (California tax
exemption provision which placed burden on taxpayer to prove that he or she did not
engage in criminal speech violated requirements of due process).
37. See, e.g., State v. Farley, 48 Wn. 2d 11, 290 P.2d 987 (1955); MCCORMICK,
supra note 15, § 341; 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2497 (3d ed. 1940).
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defendant, both to protect against erroneous convictions and to keep
intact the defendant's presumption of innocence. It also noted that a
stringent burden of proof on the state furthers respect and confidence
in the criminal justice system and allows every person to be secure in
the knowledge that "his government cannot adjudge him guilty of a
criminal offense without convincing a proper factfinder of his guilt
with utmost certainty." 38
The Winship concerns were strongly emphasized in Mullaney, as
the Court balanced the interests of the defendant against those of the
state. Wilbur faced a far more serious penalty than had the juvenile
respondent in Winship, yet he received less protection because he was
required to affirmatively bear the burden of persuasion. 39 Wilbur's
case was further assisted by the Court's finding that malice afore-
thought was "the single most important factor in determining the degree
of culpability attaching to an unlawful homicide" 40 and that states
had evidenced a clear trend in requiring the prosecution to prove this
fact.4t
The state in Mullaney satisfied the technical proof requirements of
Maine's homicide statute42 by showing that the killing was unlawful
and intentional. Because it had proven beyond a reasonable doubt
every fact necessary to constitute the crime, the state argued that Win-
ship principles were inapplicable. It further maintained that the Win-
ship burden of proof requirement should apply only to facts which, if
not proven, would wholly exonerate the defendant. The state went on
to argue that since under the Maine statute43 Wilbur would be con-
victed of some degree of the crime of homicide, he had already been
stigmatized and would probably lose his liberty-the fundamental in-
38. 397 U.S. at 364. Ashford, supra note 13, at 191-92, points out further prob-
lems with giving the defendant the burden of persuasion in this context. The criminal
law should guard not only against wrongful convictions, but against the arrest and
trial of innocent persons. Affirmative defenses allow for the very real possibility that
large numbers of persons could be arrested for broadly defined crimes and later be
found to fit under one of the affirmative defense exceptions. Further, the trial process
could turn into an inquisitorial system, with the proof largely a result of the exculpa-
tory efforts of the defendant.
39. Wilbur, upon conviction for murder, would have received a mandatory sen-
tence of life imprisonment. In Winship, the defendant was faced with only a 4 2-year
maximum extension of sentence in a juvenile institution "benevolent" in character.
421 U.S. at 700. Further, in Winship, the state had retained the burden of proof by
a preponderance of the evidence.
40. 421 U.S. at 696.
41. LAFAVE, supra note 18, § 68, at 539-40.
42. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2651 (1964) (repealed 1975). See note I supra.
43. See note I supra.
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terests which the Winship decision sought to protect. Both of these
arguments were characterized as "formalism" by the Court.44 It
looked beyond Maine's procedural requirements to what in fact en-
compassed the crime of murder and found malice aforethought to be
an implied element of great importance. The Winship decision was
liberally construed and found to be concerned with any criminal sanc-
tions directly affecting the defendant's interests, including severity of
the sentence as well as guilt or innocence.
The Winship decision requires the state to prove every fact neces-
sary to constitute the crime; the Court in Mullaney expanded this
definition of "fact" beyond the stated statutory elements to any fact
seriously affecting the defendant's culpability. It did so to prevent a
state from masking an element of a crime in the guise of an affirma-
tive defense, thereby undermining the interests of Winship without
effecting a substantive change in the law.45 If the Court had limited its
analysis to consideration of technical statutory elements, states would
have been left free to simply redefine their criminal statutes, charac-
terizing certain elements as factors having to do only with punishment
and thus shifting important burdens of proof to defendants. A prose-
cutor could charge all degrees of a crime as a single offense and leave
it for the defendant to reduce the punishment accordingly by proving
his or her innocence of the more serious offenses charged.46
44. 421 U.S. at 699. The Court quickly dismissed the state's concerns with the
practical difficulties implicit in negating the affirmative defense. In light of the tradi-
tional burden upon the state in a criminal trial, the Court could not find any "unique
hardship" that would warrant shifting the burden of proof to the defendant. Id. at 702.
A "comparative convenience test" had been previously articulated by the Court with
regard to presumptions: that if the defendant has ready access to evidence, it is fair
to require him to come forward with such evidence where there would otherwise be
a severe burden on the state. Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82 (1934). The Court
did not seem to utilize any such test in Mullaney; the interests of the defendant were
considered so fundamental that possible hardship to the state was of secondary im-
portance.
45. 421 U.S. at 698-99.
46. The Supreme Court dealt with similar concerns in a prior case, United States
v. Romano, 382 U.S. 136 (1965). Congress had created a presumption inferring pos-
session of an illegal still from presence at a still site. Under § 5601(a)(1) of the
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, "possession, custody or control" of an illegal still authorized
conviction. The Government argued that Congress' greater power to make presence a
crime necessarily included the lesser power to make presence the basis of a presump-
tion of "possession, custody or control." The Court instead found that Congress must
clearly set forth all the elements of the crime and cannot rely on an inference simply
to ease the state's burden of proof:
It may be, of course, that Congress has the power to make presence at an illegal
still a punishable crime, but we find no clear indication that it intended to so
exercise this power. The crime remains possession, not presence, and, with all due
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Because the Court in Mullaney employed its balancing test in the
context of the heat of passion defense, other affirmative defenses will
have to be evaluated individually. The standard resulting from this
decision most probably allows an affirmative defense to stand only
where the legislature would impose equal criminal culpability if no
such defense were available (e.g., a finding of second-degree kidnap-
ping where the defendant took his or her own child with no intent to
harm) and if historically the defense has not been considered an ele-
ment of the crime. This realistically includes only those situations
where a liberalization of the law affords a benefit to the defendant in
the form of an affirmative defense that was previously unavailable. 47
Early court interpretations of the Mullaney holding have tended to
substantiate this view. 48
deference to the judgment of Congress. the former may not constitutionally be
inferred from the latter.
382 U.S. at 144 (footnotes omitted).
47. But see Christie. supra note 28. Christie and Pye point out that a preoccupa-
tion with procedural proof requirements could actually work to the detriment of the
defendant by encouraging the legislature to establish stricter criminal statutes that
eliminate any exculpatory or mitigating factors that the defendant might want to
prove. They suggest that those interested in criminal procedural reform concentrate
on how the process works in practice, rather than on the formal characteristics of
the system.
48. The most extensive analysis of the Mullaney opinion to date is offered by the
Maryland court of special appeals in Evans v. State, 28 Md. App. 640. 349 A.2d 300
(1975). Although the court found that Mullaney would not render an "innocuous
statement as to burden of proof' unconstitutional, 349 A.2d at 326-27, or a presump-
tion giving the defendant only the burden of production, it did find that any presump-
tion placing upon the defendant an ultimate burden of persuasion by any standards of
proof, on any issue (this encompasses all affirmative defenses) would hence be found
unconstitutional. The court strongly encouraged a "systematic linguistic house-
cleaning," id. at 325, for the purpose of defining clearly the two elements of the burden
of proof (production and persuasion) and the several meanings of presumptions. This
would necessitate culling out any unconstitutional procedures, i.e., any presumptions
that place the burden of persuasion on the defendant and any affirmative defenses.
Two courts, considering statutory schemes similar to the Maine code provisions.
have held that the state must prove "extreme emotional disturbance" when raised as
a defense, in order to comply with Mullaney. Fuentes v. State, 349 A.2d I (Del.
1975); People v. Balogun. 82 Misc. 2d 907, 372 N.Y.S.2d 384 (1975). But see People
v. Patterson. 39 N.Y.2d 288, 347 N.E.2d 898, 383 N.Y.S.2d 389 (1976). holding
that this affirmative defense is only a "collateral matter" properly proved by the de-
fendant. Another court has found, in light of Mullaney, that it is unconstitutional to
place on the defendant the burden of proving self-defense to the satisfaction of the
jury. State v. Hankerson, 288 N.C. 632, 220 S.E.2d 575 (1975). A New York statute
which presumed a robbery weapon to be loaded and placed the burden on the de-
fendant to prove the contrary has also been found to violate Mullaney. People v.
Smith. 380 N.Y.S.2d 569 (Sup. Ct. 1976).
A New York court has found that Mullaney does not apply to the defense of en-
trapment. People v. Long, 83 Misc. 2d 14, 372 N.Y.S.2d 389 (1975). The entrapment
defense can be distinguished, however. There the defendant admits both the ,nens rea
and the actus reus of the criminal act, and the issue is to what degree law enforce-
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III. ANALYSIS OF AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES IN THE
NEW WASHINGTON CRIMINAL CODE
The remainder of this note concerns presumptions and preponder-
ance of the evidence (affirmative) defenses in Washington's new crim-
inal code.49 Three presumptions will be discussed: the inference of
intent in burglary prosecutions; 50 the presumption of intent upon
failure to return a vehicle pursuant to a rental or lease agreement;51
and the presumption of knowledge from possession of stolen prop-
erty.52 Seven preponderance of the evidence defenses will also be ad-
dressed: the insanity defense;53 and defenses relating to reckless burn-
ing,54 compounding a crime, 55 second-degree kidnapping,56 rendering
criminal assistance,5 7 felony murder,58 and second-degree rape.59
Upon a balancing of the interests of the state and defendant as in
Mullaney, Washington's affirmative defenses to felony murder and to
second-degree rape should be the only defenses to successfully pass
court scrutiny. In all other situations, the absence of the defense ap-
pears to constitute an unstated fact that must necessarily exist before
imposing the criminal sanction. Under the guidelines in Mullaney, this
is especially true of those criminal statutes where a successful affirma-
ment officers induced him or her to commit the crime. Entrapment acts to deter
reprehensible police conduct. It is used almost exclusively to uncover crimes com-
mitted against willing victims, e.g., drug sales, gambling, bribery. For a contrary hold-'
ing see State v. Matheson, 20 CRIM. L. RPTR. 2034 (Me. Sup. Jud. Ct., Sept. 2, 1976).
See generally LAFAVE, supra note 18, § 48.
Two courts have found that Mullaney does not apply to the insanity defense, largely
on the strength of Justice Rehnquist's concurring opinion. Rivera v. State, 351 A.2d
561 (Del. 1976); State v. Berry, 324 So. 2d 822 (La. 1975). See note 82 and accom-
panying text infra.
In New Jersey, mere proof of a killing does not give rise to a presumption of
malice; the state must first prove an "unlawful killing" in establishing second-degree
murder before malice can be implied. Unlike Maine, where malice aforethought had
remained a policy presumption indicating that homicide was presumed not to have
occurred in the heat of passion, "malice," as it has been interpreted in New Jersey
criminal law, signifies a substantive element of intent requiring the state to prove intent
to kill or inflict great bodily harm. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has
held that the Mullaney principles are not violated in these circumstances. Castro v.
Regan, 525 F.2d 1157 (3d Cir. 1975).
49. WASH. REV. CODE tit. 9A (Supp. 1975). See also id. ch. 9.79.
50. Id. § 9A.52.040.
51. Id. § 9A.56.090.
52. Id. § 9A.56.140.
53. Id. § 9A.12.010.
54. Id. § 9A.48.060.
55. Id. § 9A.76.100(2).
56. Id. § 9A.40.030(2).
57. Id. §§ 9A.76.070(2), .080(2).




tive defense totally relieves the defendant of criminal culpability for
his or her acts, or where the state relies on a presumption or on cir-
cumstantial evidence to establish the fact in issue.
A. Presumptive Devices in the New Code
Three newly enacted criminal statutes in the Washington code con-
tain the following presumptive devices, which operate in the same
procedural fashion as did the presumption of malice aforethought in
Mullaney: the inference of intent in burglary prosecutions, 60 the pre-
sumption of intent upon failure to return a vehicle pursuant to a rental
or lease agreement, 61 and the presumption of knowledge from posses-
sion of stolen property.62 These presumptions not only assist the state
in proving a necessary element, but also shift the burden of proof to
the defendant to negate the element by a preponderance of the evi-
dence. 63 Although it is permissible for the state to employ a presump-
tion when there is a high probability that the fact in issue exists given
circumstantial evidence, the Mullaney standard prohibits the state
from further shifting the proof burden to the defendant with respect to
a specific statutory element, as it has done in these three code sections.
A defendant may be inferred to have intended to commit a burglary
by his or her unlawful presence in a building unless such presence is
explained by evidence satisfactory to the trier of fact to be noncrim-
inal activity. 64 "Evidence satisfactory to the trier of fact" is not de-
60. Id. § 9A.52.040.
6L Id. § 9A.56.090.
62. Id. § 9A.56.140.
63. Two linguistic devices are employed in these statutes that give a defendant
something akin to a preponderance of the evidence proof burden. The first is "evidence
satisfactory to the trier of fact." Id. § 9A.52.040 (presumption as to burglary). The
second is "evidence raising a reasonable inference." Id. §§ 9A.56.090, .140 (presump-
tion on failure to return vehicle; presumption upon possession of stolen property).
For a discussion on presumptive devices in the new code, see notes 64-71 and ac-
companying text infra.
64. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.52.040 (Supp. 1975) reads as follows:
In any prosecution for burglary, any person who enters or remains unlawfully
in a building may be inferred to have acted with intent to commit a crime
against a person or property therein, unless such entering or remaining shall be
explained by evidence satisfactory to the trier of fact to have been made without
such criminal intent.
The inference of intent to commit burglary existed in substantially the same form
under the former Washington statute. Ch. 249, § 328, [1909] Wash. Laws 989 (codi-
fied at WASH. REV. CODE § 9.19.030 (1974), repealed effective July 1, 1976). Although
Washington courts have held this inference to be constitutional because there is no
shift in the burden of proof, they have done so on the ground that the statutory
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fined in the new code. One would assume that "preponderance of the
evidence" is the intended standard of proof, although it is unusual that
the legislature did not clearly specify the standard here as it did in the
rest of the code.6 5 This lack of specificity may allow a jury to reject
any evidence offered.66 Because the jury is not given adequate guide-
lines for reaching a decision, this statute should be redrafted. It is nec-
essary, however, in light of Mullaney's effect on such presumptive
devices, that this presumption be sufficiently rebutted by the defend-
ant's production of "some evidence," thereby leaving the state with the
ultimate burden of persuasion. 67
language "refers to the absence of satisfactory evidence generally and not to the
silence of the accused." State v. Taplin, 9 Wn. App. 545, 547, 513 P.2d 549, 550
(1973). Practically speaking, however, the defendant must offer some sort of defense
meeting some burden of proof to keep the presumption from applying.
Courts have defined this inference in a variety of ways. Some courts have held that
the presumption is not conclusive and that the instruction should be that the jury
"may draw the inference ... State v. Galen, 5 Wn. App. 353, 359, 487 P.2d 273,
277 (1971) (emphasis added). This interpretation of the presumptive language may
not violate the Mullaney standard. But see note 67 infra. Other courts have held that
while the presumption is not conclusive, it does apply unless it is explained to the
satisfaction of the jury to have been made without criminal intent. State v. Durning,
71 Wn. 2d 675, 430 P.2d 546 (1967); State v. Garter, 5 Wn. App. 802, 490 P.2d
1346 (1971). A Washington court has recently held that a jury instruction deeming
criminal intent from an unlawful breaking and entering of a building without allow-
ing for explanation by the defendant unconstitutionally denies the right to a jury trial.
State v. Briand, 15 Wn. App. 352, 549 P.2d 29 (1976).
65. Cosway suggests that this wording might unintentionally result in placing the
burden on the state. He reasons that because the burglary section does not specifically
require a preponderance of the evidence (which, under WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.52.040
(Supp. 1975), would mean that the state would have no burden to negate the de-
fense), the statute could be construed to place the burden of persuasion on the state.
Cosway, supra note 15, at 63 n.14. This result seems unlikely, however, given the
general statutory scheme and obvious intent of the legislature.
66. Judicial construction of a similar statute in the prior Washington code offers
little assistance. "Satisfactory evidence" has been defined as testimony believed by thejury. State v. Westphal, 62 Wn. 2d 301, 382 P.2d 269 (1963). A recent definition was
offered in State v. Hankerson, 288 N.C. 632, 220 S.E.2d 575, 587 (1975): "['Satis-
factory evidence' means] a standard no greater and at the same time one not signifi-
cantly less than persuasion by a preponderance of the evidence. . . . [T] his evi-
dence must satisfy or persuade the jury of the truth of the existence of these provoca-
tions .... " But even assuming that the jury was instructed that a fact negating any
element of alleged burglary would be satisfactory, the jury would still not know what
standard of proof the defendant must meet. See Ashford, supra note 13, at 204-05.
For these reasons alone the legislature should redraft this statute.
67. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia re-
cently held a jury instruction presuming guilt of burglary from possession of a stolen
vehicle to be a denial of due process. The court found that the charge as a whole ren-
dered the process fundamentally unfair. Byrd v. Hopper, 402 F. Supp. 787 (N.D. Ga.
1975). The Georgia jury instruction stated that the defendant's possession of a re-
cently stolen vehicle, "if not satisfactorily explained, consistent with his innocence,
raise [s] the presumption of guilt and it would authorize you to identify the Defen-
dant as the guilty party and to convict him of the crime as charged." Id. at 788. The
court, finding that the charge not only shifted the burden of going forward with, the
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Two presumptions are even more obscurely worded. A person who
does not return a rented or leased vehicle after the expiration date is
presumed to have intended to defraud the owner, unless such action is
explained by evidence raising a reasonable inference that there was no
criminal intent.6 8 Likewise, when a person possesses two or more
stolen credit cards, he or she is presumed to know that they are stolen
unless a reasonable inference of noncriminal intent can be shown to
the trier of fact.69 Because "reasonable inference" has not been de-
fined in the new code, it is unclear whether the defendant may rebut
these presumptions by producing "some evidence," or whether he or
she has the further burden of persuasion by a preponderance of the
evidence but had the legal effect of shifting the burden of proof, stated: "The essence
of the charge is that if the defendant does not offer satisfactory proof to the jury. he
is presumed guilty." Id. at 790.
The state court's instructions on the presumption of innocence and reasonable doubt
did not cure the charge, for the entire charge could have been taken to state that
"the defendant entered into the trial with a presumption of innocence but that upon
proof beyond a reasonable doubt that he was in recent possession of the stolen car.
he is then presumed guilty, absent satisfactory proof to the contrary." Id. While the
problem with the jury instructions in this instance might have been attributable to
ambiguity, the federal district court makes it very clear that any presumption effec-
tively shifting the burden of persuasion to the defendant is unconstitutional. A similar
conclusion was reached by the Maryland court of special appeals after an exhaustive
analysis of Mullaney. See note 48 supra.
68. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.56.090 (Supp. 1975) provides as follows:
Any person to whom a motor vehicle, or piece of machinery or equipment having
a fair market value in excess of one thousand five hundred dollars is delivered on
a rental or lease basis under any agreement in writing providing for its return to a
particular place at a particular time, who refuses or wilfully neglects to return
such vehicle or piece of machinery or equipment after the expiration of a reason-
able time after a notice in writing proved to have been duly mailed by regis-
tered or certified mail with return receipt requested addressed to the last known
address of the person who rented or leased the motor vehicle, or piece of ma-
chinery or equipment, shall be presumed to have intended to deprive or defraud
the owner thereof within the meaning of RCW 9A.56.020 defining the crime of
theft. This presumption may be rebutted by evidence raising a reasonable in-
ference that the failure to return the vehicle or piece of machinery or equip-
ment was not with the intent to defraud or otherwise deprive the owner of his
property.
69. Id. § 9A.56.140 reads as follows:
(1) "Possessing stolen property" means knowingly to receive, retain, possess.
conceal, or dispose of stolen property knowing that it has been stolen and to
withhold or appropriate the same to the use of any person other than the true
owner or person entitled thereto.
(2) The fact that the person who stole the property has not been convicted.
apprehended, or identified is not a defense to a charge of possessing stolen pro-
perty.
(3) When a person not an issuer or agent thereof has in his possession or under
his control stolen credit cards issued in the names of two or more persons. he
shall be presumed to know that they are stolen. This presumption may be re-
butted by evidence raising a reasonable inference that the possession of such
stolen credit cards was without knowledge that they were stolen.
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evidence. But since "intent to defraud" is clearly a common law ele-
ment of the crime of larceny,70 on balance both these statutes should
be redrafted to specify clearly that the burden of persuasion, beyond a
reasonable doubt, is on the state.71
B. Affirmative Defenses that Operate as Complete Defenses
The Court in Mullaney stressed that the Winship decision was con-
cerned with any degree of stigmatization to the defendant, including
severity of the sentence. Three statutes in the new code offer complete
defenses which serve to absolve the defendant from any criminal lia-
bility: the affirmative defense of insanity;72 and the affirmative de-
fenses to reckless burning73 and to compounding a crime.74 In these
instances, it is especially clear that some implied element is negated
without which the state will not prescribe punishment.
The insanity defense in Washington assists the state by presuming
each defendant is able to take responsibility for criminal actions.75 A
70. See LAFAVE, supra note 18, § 88, at 637; PERKINS, supra note 9, at 265-66.
71. The above three presumptions are also subject to constitutional attack on
other grounds. The Washington supreme court recently held that ch. 32, § 1, [ 1965]
Wash. Laws 1017 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 9.54.140 (1974), now WASH. REV.
CODE § 9A.56.090 (Supp. 1975)), establishing a rebuttable presumption of larcenous
intent from failure to return leased property, was an unconstitutional violation of a
defendant's due process rights. The court unanimously agreed that the fact that
leased property was not returned did not establish larcenous intent beyond a rea-
sonable doubt as required by Winship. State v. Alcantara, 87 Wn. 2d 393, 552 P.2d
1049 (1976). It would seem that the presumption of intent to burglarize from un-
lawvful presence in a building and the presumption of knowledge that credit cards are
stolen from mere possession of the cards could likewise be questioned on the ground
that the proven fact does not establish the necessary element beyond a reasonable
doubt.
72. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.12.010 (Supp. 1975).
73. Id. § 9A.48.060.
74. Id. § 9A.76.100(2).
75. Fewer than half of the states, however, concur with this position. Courts in
26 states and the federal system hold that once sanity is raised as an issue in the
trial, the prosecution must prove sanity beyond a reasonable doubt, as it must prove
any other element of the crime. Under the Mullaney analysis, this shows a trend
toward placing the burden of persuasion on the state. The latest compilation of state
law concerning the burden of persuasion as to the insanity defense is found in Annot.,
17 A.L.R.3d 146 (1968). For a discussion of the insanity defense in Washington,
see Morris, Criminal Insanity, 43 WASH. L. REy. 583 (1968). See also Comment,
Mental Commitment and the Principle of Equivalence, 51 WASH. L. REV. 733
(1976). See generally A. GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE (1967).
Courts of this persuasion closely identify sanity with intent; if sanity is doubted,
then the requisite mens rea to find criminal guilt is in doubt, and the prosecutor
must prove sanity to prove every fact necessary to constitute the crime. See S. GLUECK,
MENTAL DISORDER AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 41 (1925); LAFAVE, supra note 18, § 40, at 313.
This approach to the insanity defense is well articulated in a recent Colorado deci-
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traditional justification for shifting the burden of persuasion to the
defendant has been that sanity or insanity is a fact more within the
defendant's knowledge and, by its nature, easier for the defendant to
prove.76 The same could be said of malice aforethought, however, or
of any other mental element that the state is presently required to
prove. The prosecutor is assisted by a variety of investigative devices
and receives ample notice of the defendant's intent to rely on the in-
sanity defense because notice of reliance upon an insanity plea must
be filed within ten days of arraignment.77 Given this notice provision
and state investigative power, including needed access to medical testi-
mony, the state is probably not faced with a "unique hardship," as
discussed by the Court in Mullaney.78
If a defendant is found not guilty by reason of insanity, he or she
will receive treatment under Washington's recently revised criminal
commitment statute,79 which presents a more attractive prospect than
a criminal penalty, which could involve anything from jail time to a
death sentence.80 As reflected in both Winship and Mullaney, criminal
sion. where the court found mental capacity to commit a crime to be a material ele-
ment of a criminal action. When sanity is put into question, the court held, the state's
due process clause requires the prosecution to prove sanity beyond a reasonable doubt.
People ex rel. Juhan v. District Court, 165 Colo. 253, 439 P.2d 741 (1968). The
same rationale was adopted by the Iowa court in State v. Thomas. 219 N.W.2d 3
(Iowa 1974). See also Note, 1969 Wis. L. REV. 968.
76. A. BROOKS, LAW, PSYCHIATRY AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM 305 (1974);
Comment, Insanity-The Burden of Proof, 30 LA. L. REV. 117 (1969).
77. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.77.030 (1974). The defendant must file notice of an
intent to rely on the insanity defense within ten days of arraignment, or at a later
time if the court allows, if evidence of insanity is to be admitted at trial.
The state also has at its disposal results of police investigations, its own investiga-
tions, and use of inquiry judge subpoena power to examine all those who might have
knowledge of the defendant and the crime committed. The inquiry judge provision.
id. § 10.27.170. enacted in 1974 in response to concerns over an unwieldy and ex-
pensive grand jury system, provides for a more streamlined information collecting
process as follows:
When any public attorney, corporation counsel or city attorney has reason to
suspect crime or corruption, within the jurisdiction of such attorney, and there
is reason to believe that there are persons who may be able to give material
testimony or provide material evidence concerning such suspected crime or
corruption, such attorney may petition the judge designated as a special inquiry
judge pursuant to RCW 10.27.050 for an order directed to such persons com-
manding them to appear at a designated time and place in said county and to
then and there answer such questions concerning the suspected crime or corrup-
tion as the special inquiry judge may approve, or provide evidence as directed
by the special inquiry judge.
78. 421 U.S. at 702.
79. See generally WASH. REV. CODE §§ 10.77.010-.930 (1974). These sections of
the code provide for many long-awaited changes in the treatment of the criminally
insane, including periodic examinations and conditional releases.
80. Washington voters on November 4. 1975, passed Initiative Measure No. 316
(codified at WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9A.32.045-.047, .900-.901 (Supp. 1975)), approv-
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sanctions are generally conditioned on a finding of moral culpability
for the act. The Judiciary Committee of the Washington Legislative
Council in its report on possible code revisions suggests that the
burden of persuasion be placed on the state for this reason:81
[There is] no compelling reason. . . apparent why the issue of moral
responsibility-an element of every criminal offense-should be
treated differently in terms of burdens of proof than all the other ele-
ments of the offense which generally have the burden of proof beyond
a reasonable doubt placed upon the state.
The Court in Mullaney stressed substantive considerations. In the
future it may find sanity (if raised as an issue) to be an element re-
quiring proof by the state beyond a reasonable doubt.82 The Wash-
ington legislature should redraft this section, substituting the judiciary
committee's recommendation assigning to the defendant the burden of
production as to insanity, and to the state the burden of persuasion as
to sanity.83
ing a mandatory death sentence for cases of aggravated murder. A recent United
States Supreme Court decision, however, has apparently invalidated the mandatory
death sentence. Gregg v. Georgia, 96 S. Ct. 2909 (1976).
81. Judiciary Committee Proposed Code, supra note 10, § 9A.12.010, Comment
ai 62.
82. As Justice Rehnquist's concurring opinion indicated, the Court held in Leland
v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952), that it was not unconstitutional for an accused to be
required to prove his sanity beyond a reasonable doubt. There have been vast changes
in criminal procedure in the 23 years since Leland, however, and it is particularly
telling that the Winship decision was grounded largely on Justice Frankfurter's vigor-
ous dissent in Leland:
It is the duty of the Government to establish . . . guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. This notion-basic in our law and rightly one of the boasts of a free so-
ciety-is a requirement and a safeguard of due process of law in the historic,
procedural content of "due process."
343 U.S. at 802-03, quoted in 397 U.S. at 362. Frankfurter's dissent clearly reflected
his belief that a finding of "guilt" necessitates sanity on the part of the defendant.
The Leland decision has not only been discredited by the Court's reliance on the
Leland dissent in Mullaney, but by the growing trend toward moving the burden of
persuasion to the state in this matter. LAFAvE, supra note 18, § 21, at 153. The Ore-
gon statute found to be constitutional in Leland has since been repealed and there is
presently no jurisdiction holding that a defendant has the burden of proof beyond
a reasonable doubt for any defense.
The Model Penal Code gives the defendant the burden of production only as to
insanity. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.03(1) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962). The Code
drafters point out: "[T] he grammatical point that the defense rests on an exception
or proviso divorced from the definition of the crime is [not] potently persuasive." Id.
§ 1.13, Comment at 110 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955). This was precisely the situation
in Leland, and if taken seriously, could lead to legislative redefinition of crimes that
concerned the Court to such an extent in Mullaney. But see Rivera v. State, 351 A.2d
561 (Del. 1976), and State v. Berry, 324 So. 2d 822 (La. 1975), both holding that
Mullaney does not affect the burden of proof on the insanity defense.
83. Judiciary Committee P5roposed Code, supra note 10, § 9A.12.010. The Court
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A person is guilty of reckless burning in the first degree if, by know-
ingly causing a fire or explosion, he or she recklessly damages some sort
of structure or crop.84 One is guilty of reckless burning in the second
degree if he or she knowingly causes a fire or explosion and thereby
recklessly places a structure or crop in danger.85 It is a complete defense
to either of these charges if the defendant can prove with a preponder-
ance of the evidence that there was a lawful purpose for the burning,
and that he or she owned the property or had permission to burn it. 86
The prior Washington statute made lack of a possessory interest a
necessary element of the crime, and the Washington courts held that
intent must also be considered an element and proven by the state. 87
did not discuss the burden of production in Mullaney. One commentator has argued
that even a burden of production might be constitutionally impermissible, but cites
no authority supporting this opinion. Cosway, supra note 15, at 70-71. It would be
unrealistic to make the prosecution prove in every case the converse of all affirmative
defenses. Experience shows that most people who commit crimes are sane and con-
scious. See Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469 (1895). Much time would be wasted
and the trial system made unduly complex if the state had to prove matters upon
which there was no dispute. Because the defendant in that event has a greater oppor-
tunity to know the facts, it is reasonable to place the burden of production on him or
her.
84. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.48.040 (Supp. 1975).
85. Id. § 9A.48.050.
86. Id. § 9A.48.060 provides as follows:
In any prosecution for the crime of reckless burning in the first or second de-
grees, it shall be a defense if the defendant establishes by a preponderance of the
evidence that:
(a) No person other than the defendant had a possessory. or pecuniary inter-
est in the damaged or endangered property, or if other persons had such an in-
terest, all of them consented to the defendant's conduct; and
(b) The defendant's sole intent was to destroy or damage the property for a
lawful purpose.
87. Prior to 1963, the Washington second-degree arson statute, ch. 265. § 1.
[1927] Wash. Laws 616 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 9.09.020 (Supp. 1961). as
amended, WASH. REV. CODE § 9.09.020 (1974)) (now WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.48.030
(Supp. 1975)), applied to "[e]very person who, under circumstances not amounting
to arson in the first degree, shall wilfully burn or set on fire any building. ... The
Washington supreme court in State v. Spino, 61 Wn. 2d 246, 377 P.2d 868 (1963).
held this statute to be an arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of police power because
"[t] here is no necessity to charge and prove that the fire was harmful or was intended
to be harmful." The court noted:
Under the statute as it is worded, an indictment can be framed and a conviction
obtained against one who innocently sets fire to his own property which is worth-
less, or which he deems worthless, for the sole purpose of disposing of it, or
against one who sets any other beneficial fire, if the thing burned is the property
of any person.
Id. at 250, 377 P.2d at 870. Although the statute was amended in 1963 to comport
with the court's concerns by changing the wording to "wilfully and maliciously burn."
ch. 11, § 2, [1963] Wash. Laws 286, Washington's new affirmative defenses present
the same problem that the Washington supreme court found to be unconstitutionally
overbroad in 1963. It is for the state to prove intent and nonownership of the prop-
erty beyond a reasonable doubt. In the new code, the defendant must prove both
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Although the criminal penalties for the above actions are relatively
low (a gross misdemeanor and misdemeanor respectively), the de-
fendant still faces criminal prosecution and danger of erroneous stig-
matization for innocent actions. Ascertaining ownership of damaged
or threatened property and the defendant's purposes in engaging in
the burning should not overtax the state's investigators; therefore, in-
sufficient state interests exist to warrant this shifting of the burden of
persuasion to the defendant.
A person is guilty of compounding a crime if he agrees to confer or
to accept any "pecuniary benefit" in consideration of a promise to
forego the initiation of prosecution for a crime.88 The legislature has
provided a complete defense to compounding a crime if the defendant
can prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the pecuniary ben-
efit did not exceed an amount which he or she believed to be due for
harm caused by the crime.89 Historically, the state had to prove that
the defendant was not accepting a payment allowed by law.90 If the
defendant raised the defense that he had reasonably believed that he
was receiving money owed to him, the state had to prove the illegality
of the transaction. Under Mullaney standards, the present statute
should leave the burden of proof with the state, both for historical
that he was sole owner of the property and that his or her sole intent was lawful.
WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.48.060 (Supp. 1975).
The judiciary committee discussion of its proposed crime of third-degree arson
(equivalent to the adopted crime of reckless burning in the first degree), Judiciary
Committee Proposed Code, supra note 10, § 9A.48.030, Comment at 200-03, states
that a person should be able to "escape criminal liability where the only interests
hurt... are his own." Judiciary Committee Proposed Code, supra note 10, § 9A.48.030,
Comment at 204. Under its proposal, when the defendant raised the defense of total
ownership, the state would have to prove the contrary (the judiciary committee never
constructed an affirmative defense of "lawful intent" such as exists in the new code).
Under the judiciary committee's proposed statute for reckless burning (equivalent to
the adopted reckless burning in the second degree statute), a defendant would have
been guilty if he or she recklessly placed "a building of another in danger of destruc-
tion or damage." Judiciary Committee Proposed Code, supra note 10, § 9A.48.040.
In this instance, nonownership obviously would become an element to be proven by
the state if raised as a defense.
88. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9A.76.100(1)(a)-(b) (Supp. 1975) provide:
(1) A person is guilty of compounding if:
(a) He requests, accepts, or agrees to accept any pecuniary benefit pursuant to
an agreement or understanding that he will refrain from initiating a prosecution
for a crime; or
(b) He confers, or offers or agrees to confer, any pecuniary benefit upon an-
other pursuant to an agreement or understanding that such other person will
refrain from initiating a prosecution for a crime.
89. Id. § 9A.76.100(2).
90. Ch. 249, § 115, [1909] Wash. Laws 923 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE §
9.69.090 (1974), repealed effective July 1, 1976).
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reasons and because of the danger of erroneous stigmatization and
conviction for the innocent action. 91
C. Affirmative Defenses that Reduce the Criminal Penalty
Two defenses in the new code reduce the penalty for criminal ac-
tion: the affirmative defense to kidnapping in the second degree, 92 and
the affirmative defense to rendering criminal assistance.93 Mullaney
dealt directly with a defense which, if successful, merely reduced the
penalty. The Court clearly held that the Winship considerations ap-
plied not only to the determination of guilt or innocence but also to
the severity of the punishment received. Both such defenses in the
Washington code appear to deny the defendant due process under the
Mullaney standard.
In the new Washington criminal code, kidnapping in the second
degree is described generally as any abduction not included within
kidnapping in the first degree. 94 A defendant is not guilty of second-
degree kidnapping if it is shown by a preponderance of the evidence
that there was no use of, or intent to use, deadly force and that the
defendant was a relative of the alleged victim, intending only to as-
sume custody of that person.95 This statute allows the state to intro-
91. For "compounding a crime," the judiciary committee recommended giving
only the burden of production to the defendant, noting this defense was "fair and
realistic and . . . in accord with common practice." Judiciary Committee Proposed
Code, supra note 10, § 9A.76.080, Comment at 323.
The MODEL PENAL CODE § 208.32 A, Comment at 203 (Tent. Draft No. 9. 1959).
further illustrates the rationality of such an exception:
Our society does not, in general, impose penal sanctions to compel persons to
inform authorities of crime. A person who refrains from reporting a crime of
which he was the victim, because his loss has been made good, is no more dere-
lict in his social duty than one who, out of indifference or friendship to the of-
fender, fails to report a known offense. The threat of prosecution for com-
pounding is. in any event, ineffective to promote reporting of offenses by vic-
tims who are willing to "settle" with the offender, since compounding laws can
easily by evaded by accepting restitution or indemnification without explicit
"agreement" to drop prosecution. Finally, compounding laws impugn the wide-
spread practice of prosecutors, who are frequently content to drop prosecution
when restitution has been made by the offender.
92. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.40.030(2) (Supp. 1975).
93. Id. §§ 9A.76.070(2)(a). .080(2)(a).
94. Id. § 9A.40.030(l).
95. Id. § 9A.40.030(2). Historically, the crime of kidnapping in Washington has
been applied only to nonrelatives. and as a practical matter society is not likely to
assign such great moral culpability to a defendant who abducts a relative with no in-
tent to harm. A person was guilty of kidnapping in the second degree under the prior
Washington statute if he or she took a child under the age of 16 with intent to con-
ceal the child from "his parent, parents, guardian or other lawful person .... .- Ch.
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duce a broadly defined crime and to place the burden on the de-
fendant to reduce the charge accordingly. In all probability, such a
defendant should properly be charged at the outset with custodial in-
terference, 96 a crime involving a maximum jail term of one year, as
opposed to the 10-year term for second-degree kidnapping.97 Thus,
the differences in degree of criminal culpability are great, and conse-
quently the defendant has an appreciable interest in both the degree of
his or her stigmatization and the length of a possible jail sentence. Fur-
thermore, there is no particular hardship for the state in producing evi-
dence negating this defense. 98 The Washington legislature should
place the burden of persuasion on the state regarding the defense to
kidnapping in the second degree.
A similar problem exists in the new code's defense to rendering
criminal assistance in the first degree; a defendant is guilty of a class C
felony99 unless it can be proven by a preponderance of the evidence
that he or she was a relative, in which case the offense is a gross
misdemeanor. 100 Instructions are the same for rendering criminal
assistance in the second degree, except that the penalties are a mis-
6, § 1, [1933] Wash. Laws Ex. Sess. 8 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 9.52.010(2)
(1974), repealed effective July 1, 1976). If a parent, under this definition, was the
relative who abducted the child, he or she would not be liable for the offense. Fur-
ther, there have been no Washington cases holding guilty a defendant relative who
abducted a child with no intent to harm. The judiciary committee felt that the defen-
dant should have the burden of production and the state the burden of proof on
this issue because of the reduced seriousness of the offense:
[W] here the confinement or removal is by a relative . . . without the use or
threat of deadly force, and where the sole object of the actor is to gain control
of the person abducted, then sections other than kidnapping are to apply. These
distinctions allow reservation of the denomination "kidnapping" for only the
most serious sorts of unlawful confinement-removal cases.
Judiciary Committee Proposed Code, supra note 10, § 9A.40.020, Comment at 161
(emphasis in original).
96. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.40.050(1) (Supp. 1975) states: "A person is guilty
of custodial interference if, knowing that he has no legal right to do so, he takes or
entices from lawful custody any incompetent person or other person entrusted by
authority of law to the custody of another person or institution."
97. Id. §§ 9A.20.020(b), .40.030(3).
98. Proving use of or intent to use deadly force should produce no greater diffi-
culty for the state than should proving other elements of intent. As the Court in
Mullaney noted, intent "may be established by adducing evidence of the factual cir-
cumstances surrounding the commission" and because intent is a fact "peculiarly
within the knowledge of the defendant ... does not . . . justify shifting the burden
to him." 421 U.S. at 702. The relationship of the defendant to the victim should be
ascertainable through routine investigatory measures.
99. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.76.070(2)(b) (Supp. 1975). The sentence for a class
C felony is imprisonment in a state correctional institution for a maximum term of
not more than five years. A fine of not more than $5,000 may also be imposed. Id.
§ 9A.20.020(I)(c).
100. Id. § 9A.76.070(2)(a).
975
Washington Law Review Vol. 51: 953, 1976
demeanor and a gross misdemeanor, respectively.101 As with kidnap-
ping, there is an appreciable difference in criminal penalties,102 and
evidence of a family relationship should be readily available to the
state. Further, nonrelationship has always been a necessary element of
the crime in Washington through specific statutory exceptions. 10 3
Thus, the statutory definitions of the crime appear contrary to Mul-
laney.
D. Affirmative Defenses that Meet the Mullaney Standard
Two affirmative defenses in the new code do not violate the due
process principles that concerned the Court in Winship and Mullaney:
the defenses to felony murder'0 4 and to second-degree rape.10 5 Both
defenses afford the defendant additional means to escape liability in
situations where he or she would previously have been held strictly
liable.
The felony murder defense is the one defense characterized by the
judiciary committee as requiring the burden of persuasion with a pre-
ponderance of the evidence to be placed on the defendant.10 6 It is a
101. Id. § 9A.76.080(2).
102. The prosecutor could charge all defendants with a criminal violation involv-
ing a possible sentence of five years in a correctional institution, id. § 9A.20.020(1).
when it is possible that the defendant should have been charged with a lesser degree
of punishment for the action (a gross misdemeanor involves at the maximum one
year in the county jail), id. § 9A.20.020(2).
103. At common law only wives were exempt from the crime of rendering crim-
inal assistance. LAFAVE, supra note 18. § 66, at 523-24. Over half the states, how-
ever, have broadened this exception. Professor LaFave feels this is justified "on the
ground that it is unrealistic to expect persons to be deterred from giving aid to their
close relations." Id. at 524. In Washington, since the enactment of the criminal code
in 1909, a wide range of relatives has been expressly excluded under the wording of
ch. 249, § 9, [1909] Wash. Laws 892 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 9.01.040 (1974).
repealed effective July 1, 1976):
Every person not standing in the relation of husband or wife, brother or sister.
parent or grandparent, child or grandchild, to the offender, who after the com-
mission of a felony shall harbor, conceal or aid such offender ... is an acces-
sory to the felony.
Thus, under the Mullaney process of historical analysis, the burden has always been
upon the state to prove the nonexistence of the relationship if raised as a defense. The
judiciary committee took the same stance, giving the defendant the burden of produc-
tion as to a relationship, and the state the ultimate burden of persuasion. See Judi-
ciary Committee Proposed Code, supra note 10, §§ 9A.76.040-.070.
104. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9A.32.030(1)(c), .050(l)(b) (Supp. 1975).
105. Id. § 9.79.160.
106. Judiciary Committee Proposed Code, supra note 10, § 9A.32.020(c), Com-
ment at 119. The judiciary committee did not discuss the offense of rape in its pro-
posed code; however, because the same factors must be considered as for felony
murder, a preponderance of the evidence defense would probably have been recom-
mended. See notes 114-15 and accompanying text infra.
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defense to felony murder in the first or second degree in the new code
if the defendant can prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he
or she did not commit or aid in the commission of the deadly act, was
not armed with a deadly weapon, did not reasonably believe that any
other participant was armed with such a weapon, and did not reason-
ably believe that the other participant intended to cause death or se-
rious injury.107
Although many commentators have questioned the wisdom of a
doctrine allowing "constructive murder" without the requisite mens
rea,08 the strict liability provisions of felony murder statutes have
generally withstood constitutional scrutiny and are presently in force
in most states.109 In contrast to the previously discussed defenses, di-
rect participation in the homicide has never been required to find a
felon guilty of a felony murder committed by an accomplice. Thus,
under historical analysis as used by the Court in Mullaney, the de-
fendant's burden of proof does not concern a fact traditionally seen as
-an "element" of the crime.
If successfully asserted, this affirmative defense would be a com-
plete defense. Because a substantial difference exists between possible
penalties, the Mullaney reasoning would generally compel the burden
of persuasion be placed on the state. This defense, however, indicates
a tentative social- recognition that one should not be strictly liable for
107. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.32.030(1)(c), .050(1)(b) (Supp. 1975).
108. See generally Moreland, A Re-Examination of the Law of Homicide in 1971:
The Model Penal Code, 59 Ky. LJ. 788 (1971); Morris, The Felon's Responsibility
for the Lethal Acts of Others, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 50 (1956); Note, 9 DUQUESNE L.
REV. 122 (1970).
109. Although the substantive application of the felony murder doctrine varies
throughout the United States, the basic principle of holding a nonkilling accomplice
liable for a death occurring in the commission of a felony is in effect in all states
except Ohio. See generally LAFAvE, supra note 18, § 71. Some states limit its appli-
cation to "inherently dangerous felonies." See, e.g., People v. Washington, 62 Cal. 2d
777, 402 P.2d 130, 133, 44 Cal. Rptr. 442, 445 (1965). It is not applied in many
states when the killing is by'a victim or policeman. Commonwealth ex rel. Smith
v. Meyers, 438 Pa. 218, 261 A.2d 550 (1970). See also People v. Washington, supra,
402 P.2d at 133, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 445. The limitations indicate some dissatisfaction
with the doctrine, and it is possible that the doctrine may be eliminated altogether
in the near future. LAFAvE, supra note 18, § 71, at 560-61.
The prior Washington felony murder statute was construed by the state supreme
court to cover accomplices not participating in the killing. State v. Carpenter, 166
Wash. 478, 7 P.2d 573 (1932). The new code provision expressly extends liability to
such accomplices and limits felony murder to the same five felonies as are listed in
the former code. See WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.32.030 (Supp. 1975); ch. 112, § 1,
[1919] Wash. Laws 273 (codified at WASH. REv. CODE § 9.48.030(3) (1974), re-
pealed effective July 1, 1976). The language in the new code seems to imply that the
killing must be by the felon or accomplice, and it is clear that a felon is not guilty of
felony murder should his co-felon be killed. See Cosway, supra note 15, at 74-75.
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a killing.110 Unlike its actions with respect to other affirmative de-
fenses, the legislature would undoubtedly omit this defense totally if all
such defenses were found to be unconstitutional per se, rather than
incorporate the absence of this defense into the description bf the
crime."1 As discussed earlier,112 innovations introduced in the crim-
inal system should not be struck down without careful examination. It
would seem that the Supreme Court's intent in Mullaney would be
defeated if experimental new defenses that actually improve the de-
fendant's position were found unconstitutional.' 13
The affirmative defenses to rape in the second degree meet the Mul-
laney standard for essentially the same reasons as does the affirmative
defense to felony murder. Two different defenses are permitted: one
based on a reasonable belief that the victim was not mentally incapa-
citated or physically helpless, and the other based on a belief that the
alleged victim met the requisite age requirements.' 14 Neither of these
110. Although this defense will be of limited assistance because all four elements
must be proved conjunctively. it does seem to reflect an attitude expressed by the
Pennsylvania court in Commonwealth ex rel. Smith v. Meyers. 438 Pa. 218. 261 A.2d
550, 554: "[I] t appears that juries rebel against convictions, adopting a homemade
rule against fortuities, where a conviction must result in life imprisonment."
I 11. This is in part indicated by the legislature's cautious attitude in adopting this
defense. Washington adopted this provision from the New York penal laws, the com-
mentary of which illustrates current legislative reasoning:
[T] he most novel change appears in the exception extending a defendant an op-
portunity to fight his way out of a felony murder charge .... This phase of the
provision is based upon the theory that the felony murder doctrine, in its rigid
automatic envelopment of all participants in the underlying felony. may be un-
duly harsh in particular instances; and that some cases do arise, rare though they
may be, where it would be just and desirable to allow a non-killer defendant of
relatively minor culpability a chance of extricating himself from liability for
murder, though not, of course, from liability for the underlying felony.
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25, Practice Commentaries (McKinney 1975).
The judiciary committee noted that the burden of proof by a preponderance of
the evidence must be sustained for a successful defense and further stated: "Of
course, this defense to murder, if established, would not free the defendant from lia-
bility for the underlying felony." Judiciary Committee Proposed Code. supra note 10.
§ 9A.32.020, Comment at 119. Because this defense is undoubtedly regarded as a
magnanimous gesture on its part, the state is unlikely to be willing to pass this strin-
gent burden of proof on to the prosecution if forced to discard affirmative defenses.
112. See note 47 and accompanying text supra.
113. A strong proponent of the unconstitutionality of affirmative defenses per se
characterizes this defense as "a political compromise," "not a stand based on prin-
ciple. on a perception of just policy" and "a maneuver made for the sake of law re-
form." Fletcher, supra note 27, at 929. Although there is obviously some truth to
these characterizations, the Court in Mullaney clearly stressed substantive considera-
tions and practical results over procedural technicalities. With consideration of the
defendant's crucial interests as articulated in the Winship decision, the flexible cri-
teria set forth in Mullaney leave room for a practical compromise that will safeguard
the defendant's interests and leave room for law reform introduced through affirma-
tive defenses.
114. WASH. REv. CODE § 9.79.160 (Supp. 1975) states:
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defenses was previously allowed in Washington. Rape was essentially
a strict liability crime, and defendant's knowledge that the victim was
either incapable of consenting or below the statutory age was not an
element of the offense." 5
As with the affirmative defense to felony murder, the legislature has
given the defendant a stringent burden of proof if he or she is to be
successful in asserting the defense to second-degree rape. But even
though the proof burden is difficult to sustain, it does represent in-
creased benefit to the defendant, who would previously have been
held strictly liable in these situations. Because Mullaney is directed at
safeguarding the rights of the criminal defendant, a liberalization of
criminal penalties, even when accompanied with an affirmative de-
fense burden, should not be found a denial of due process.
IV. CONCLUSION
It should be clear that allocations of burdens of proof are only su-
perficially technical. Criminal procedure which allots substantial bur-
dens to the defendant will, to some degree, point the trial process to-
ward conviction. The Supreme Court in In re Winship held that the
Constitution requires the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
every element of the crime charged. The Court in Mullaney v. Wilbur
considered several factors in determining whether a defense burdening
the defendant affected his interests to such a degree that the defense,
once raised, should have been considered an element of the crime
required to be proven by the state. These criteria, when applied to
Washington's affirmative defenses, suggest that most of these defenses
deny due process. Only the affirmative defenses to the crimes of felony
murder and rape give the defendant an additional means to escape
criminal liability and thus meet the balance of interests between the
(1) In any prosecution under this chapter in which lack of consent is based
solely upon the victim's mental incapacity or upon the victim's being physically
helpless, it is a defense which the defendant must prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that at the time of the offense the defendant reasonably believed
that the victim was not mentally incapacitated and/or physically helpless.
(2) In any prosecution under this chapter in which the offense or degree of
the offense depends on the victim's age, it is no defense that the perpetrator did
not know the victim's age, or that the perpetrator believed the victim to be
older, as the case may be: Provided, That it is a defense which the defendant
must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that at the time of the offense
the defendant reasonably believed the alleged victim to be older based upon
declarations as to age by the alleged victim.
115. State v. Meyer, 37 Wn. 2d 759, 226 P.2d 204 (1951).
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state and the defendant. As long as society places a greater importance
on protecting the innocent than upon convicting the guilty, the state
must bear the risk of nonpersuasion on any issue that seriously in-
volves the defendant's interests.
Pamela Cowan
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